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Abstract 
This paper explores how “network governance” may be addressed through Michel 
Foucault’s notions of governmentality and power on the one hand, and the concepts of 
norms and normalization on the other. I suggest that “network governance” may be 
fruitfully analyzed as a set of governmental technologies and forms of expert knowledge 
revolving around problematizations, and norms such as autonomy, efficiency and 
accountability. Such an analysis could address the normalizing and dividing effects of the 
governmental practices and forms of knowledge that are brought into play in the attempt to 
augment the capacities of networks of individuals and organizations to conduct themselves 
in accordance with these norms. 
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Conceiving “Network governance”: The potential of the concepts of governmentality 
and normalization1
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The words “networks”, “governance” and “network governance” pop up in widely different 
institutional settings ranging from international organizations, over state institutions to 
social movements where they refer to a bewildering array of different phenomena and 
governmental practices. They are also found as conceptual categories in a rapidly 
increasing volume of scholarly literature. Within the political science literature, the notion 
of network governance has been associated with consistent attempts to extend the analysis 
of diverse forms of rule and authority. One may observe a change in analytical focus from 
narrowly defined policy communities to issue networks, from state and other public 
agencies to the relations between these and a host of private and voluntary groups and 
organizations, and from intentions, interests and preferences to concrete practices, 
mechanisms and devices of steering to name but a few examples.  
 
Despite this expansion of the field of analysis and the conceptual re-working this has 
implied, I believe that there is a need to carry the conceptualization and analysis of current 
practices of government even further. Thus, the analytical potential of network governance 
theories is, in my view, still constrained by certain predominant assumptions and 
conceptualizations relating to agency and government. First of all, one sees a tendency to 
retain the actor as the key analytical unit. While there have been sustained efforts to rid 
political analysis of a conception of the actor as one with given preferences or interests, one 
finds that the analysis of network governance is almost invariantly conceived in terms of 
networks of actors (e.g. Kickert and Koppenjan 1997: 9; Peter and Pierre 2000: 19-20).2  
This includes the conception of the state as an actor (with specifiable interests and 
jurisdiction) rather than viewing it as a contingent and more or less stable 
institutionalization or codification of concrete practices and devices of authority. As a 
consequence of this, one sees that the attempts to rid political analysis of the rational agent 
have in many cases been substituted by an interactionist framework (e.g. Kooiman 1993: 2-
3). While inspiration from hermeneutic and phenomenological lines of thought has 
provided an understanding of political actors whose preferences, interests and even 
identities are shaped by contingent interpretive, cognitive and normative horizons, they 
nonetheless depend upon individuals with an inherent capacity to act. What inter-acts then 
are not systems, practices, norms, individuals or organizations, but actors. To the extent 
that they take the capacity to act for granted, interactionist approaches are not very well 
fitted to addressing the forms of knowledge, norms and techniques through which we are 
enabled, urged and at times even forced to act.  In short, what I think we need is an 
approach that is more susceptible to addressing the concrete and mundane devices by 
which we are constituted and constitute ourselves as actors. 
 
More importantly, I believe there is a certain conceptual danger in what one could perhaps 
call the ontological foundationalism informing a widespread argument found in scholarly 
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writings, including the network governance literature. This is the claim that we in the last 
few decades have been witnessing the proliferation of network governance. Having 
remained in the shadow of an understanding of government as a more or less well-defined 
hierarchy of authority encapsulated by the state apparatus, we are now seeing a dispersal of 
authority to a wide array of mobile networks of actors, resources and institutions that 
precipitate around rapidly waxing and waning issues of public concern. Whether one points 
to the grand narratives of network society (Castells 1996) or reflexive modernity (Giddens 
1991), or to the more concrete and specific accounts of the formation and functioning of 
networks of public agencies, private organizations and diverse groups and citizens, one 
finds the articulation of a need for rearticulating our understanding of government and 
authority based on an ontological change that has taken place in recent decades. 
 
The concern for the relation between epistemology (our knowledge and theories) and 
ontology (those forms of being that our knowledge seeks to address) is of course both 
relevant and pertinent. However, I believe that the concern for our conceptual framework 
should be taken further than that. Historical sociologist Philip Abrams once argued that the 
conception of the state as a unitary actor with certain interests and power capabilities was 
but an artifact of political practice (Abrams 1988). In fact, this conception of the state as 
that standing behind the orchestration of political action, Abrams argued, tended to prevent 
us from analyzing practices of government (ibid. 82). I think we need to generalize this 
insight to all so-called actors, not only the state. An understanding of network governance 
as essentially one where the state’s capacity to undertake political action is if not replaced 
then at least supplemented by multiple actors is still caught up in sovereignty thinking. 
True, this would be a dispersed sovereignty, but it would amount to a conception of 
government in terms of sovereignty nonetheless. Consequently, I think we should try to 
wrestle free from the understanding that agency springs from various actors be that the 
state, private corporations, voluntary organizations or what have you. If not, the analysis of 
network governance risks reproducing some of the problems found in the more state-
centered forms of political analysis in which the state is seen as the sovereign actor. 
 
I propose an analytical approach that I find is better able to address how norms of 
autonomy, self-determination, influence and participation interrelate with concrete 
governmental technologies. Instead of taking agency as an inherent feature of individuals, 
organizations or networks, or as something played out along particular symbolic or 
interpretive horizons, I am proposing a conceptual framework addressing agency as 
something envisaged, enabled and spurred on by concrete governmental techniques and 
devices, and by particular norms of conduct. This would be a form of critical analysis that 
would seek to avoid passing judgments on whether or not the examined governmental 
practices are efficient or legitimate, but instead try to pay attention to the dividing and 
excluding effects of these norms and practices. That is, how are the norms and 
governmental practices that make up network governance reproducing and updating 
understandings of what we see as autonomous, efficient, or legitimate practices? And what 
sort of practices, thoughts and groups are being excluded because they are deemed 
incompatible with prevailing norms of acting and being?  
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In order to do address these questions, I am suggesting that we turn to the conceptual 
devices of norms and normalization on the one hand and Michel Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality and power on the other. In the following, I will try to explore the 
possibilities of analyzing “network governance” as a set of governmental technologies and 
forms of expert knowledge revolving around problematizations, and norms such as 
autonomy, efficiency and accountability. After an elaboration of the concept 
governmentality, I explore the notions of norm and normalization. In the most general 
terms, I am assuming that these concepts are fruitful in addressing forms of governing that 
seems increasing to work indirectly or “at a distance”. While this paper does not test this 
assumption, it does go on to provide an illustration of how we could address network 
governance in terms of technologies and norms of government. I finally draw some 
tentative conclusions on the potentials and status of such a conceptual framework for the 
study of government at a distance. 
 
 
2 Governmentality 
 
Foucault introduced the notion of governmentality in his 1978 lectures at College de France 
on ‘Security, Territory and Population’ (Foucault 1978; see also Foucault 1988). While 
Foucault had explicitly avoided the question of the state in his studies of disciplinary power, 
his problematization of the exercise of power over territories and populations forced him to 
deal with the forms of political power evolving around the modern territorial states in 
Western Europe from the 16th century onwards. However, the key category to address this 
issue was neither power nor state power, but the notion of government. Government 
referred not to the government (the state apparatus) but to the manifold ways in which the 
conduct of individuals and groups are directed. Defined as the conduct of conduct, 
government refers to the attempts to structure and nurture the field of actions of others 
(Foucault 1982: 221). The notion of conduct thus points not only to the directing of the 
conduct of others, but also to the ways in which one conducts oneself. With the term 
government, Foucault sought to dispense with the topological distinction between macro- 
and micro levels in favor of one surface of manifold and interrelated practices of 
government. Foucault tentatively distinguished between three distinct but closely 
interrelated problematizations of modern government: the governing of the state and its 
territory, the governing of individuals and populations, and the governing of the self by the 
self (Dean 1994: 176). 
 
The term governmentality – Foucault’s neologism contracting the terms government and 
rationality – was coined to denote a set of historically specific constellations of 
problematizations, forms of knowledge and practices of government (Foucault 1991a: 102; 
Foucault 1991b: 78-82). Key problematizations would be: how do we govern a territory, 
how do ensure the wealth of the nation and its inhabitants, how do we ensure the health and 
well-being of individuals and the populations? The term also points to the forms of secular 
knowledge, such as Reason of State, Mercantilism, Cameralism, Police, Political Economy, 
Social Economy, through which the problematizations of government were made visible, 
translated and enframed. Finally, the term includes a number of governmental practices, 
notably the individualizing, disciplinary techniques found in the army, the school, the 
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factory, and the asylum on the one hand, and the totalizing bio-political regulations 
targeting the population’s health, wealth and well-being that came together from the end of 
the 18th century on the other. Both the disciplinary techniques and the bio-political 
regulations came to depend on various of forms of expert knowledge (human and social 
science) dealing with the bio-medical, sociological, psychological and economic processes 
that constituted the object of liberal government. Foucault characterized this great upsurge, 
dissemination and institutionalization of the forms of knowledge and practices of 
government as the ‘governmentalization of the state’ (Foucault 1991a: 103). Unlike the 
dystopic diagnosis encapsulated in the notion of the wholly rationalized and administered 
society propagated in various ways by Max Weber and the Frankfurt School, Foucault went 
at great pains to distance himself from this etátization-of-society thesis (the penetration of 
state action into civil society) that rested on a completely different conception of 
subjectivity, power and freedom (cf. Dean 1994: 74-95). Moreover, in contrast to the 
Weberian understanding of rationality as an abstract, ideal-type on the one hand and as 
something indexed in the conscious intentions of the subject on the other, the Foucauldian 
conception of rationality is strictly practical in the sense that rationalities are regarded as 
something always embedded in practices, e.g. technologies of government (Foucault 
1991b).  
 
Foucault and analysts like Nikolas Rose have further pinned down the notion of 
governmentality by distinguishing between rationalities and technologies of government 
(Rose and Miller 1992). Technologies of government denote all those manifold systems, 
procedures, devices and methods that seek to shape the conduct of individuals and groups, 
such as types of schooling, systems of income support, methods of audit, devices for the 
organization of work etc. Now, these technologies are always informed by elements of 
thoughts, reflections and strategic calculations about how to govern properly, efficiently 
and effectively, i.e. one or more governmental rationalities. 
 
It would be a mistake to equate governmental rationalities with political intentions, goals, 
ends or programs. Likewise, political technologies cannot be equated with the more or less 
consistent materialization of such political goals. The analytical distinction between 
intentions, goals, and policies of government on the one hand, that are then implemented 
through various concrete schemes, projects and administrative devices on the other, does 
not encapsulate the distinction between rationalities and technologies of government. As 
argued by Moreira and Wahlberg, the ongoing activities of politicians, civil servants, 
businessmen, stakeholders, citizens, welfare clients etc. should be seen neither as attempts 
to implement political rationalities, nor as utilizing technologies and techniques of 
government for this aim (Moreira and Wahlberg forthcoming). Instead, it is by addressing 
the ongoing activities of negotiation, activation or empowerment that a genealogy of 
practices of government can help discern some of the various rationalities, technologies and 
techniques that are at play. In sum, the term governmentality refers neither to a theory nor 
an analytical approach, but refers to the manifold practices, forms of knowledge and 
institutions that seek to know and act upon the actions of individuals and populations. It 
refers to a modern form of rule, which operates through both bio-political and liberal 
rationalities and technologies of government, in the promotion of the health, wealth and 
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welfare of populations on the one hand, and the improvement of the capacities and 
capabilities of individuals to act responsibly on the other (Rose 1999).  
 
But does not the notion of governmentality imply that you see power almost everywhere? 
Yes, but it certainly does not mean that it excludes resistance and/or freedom as a 
possibility. On the contrary, governmentality embraces a conception of power that sees the 
latter as existing only to the extent that the individuals and groups over whom it is 
exercised are free. As a relation, the exercise of power presumes a certain form of liberty 
on both sides of that relation (Foucault 1994: 12). To Foucault, the situation in which an 
individual is left with no possibilities to resist would not qualify as a relation of power, but 
as a state of domination. The exercise of power in Foucault’s understanding then presumes 
freedom and the capacity to resist. Like power, freedom is addressed at the level of 
practices. Freedom is thus seen to consist in the reflections, decisions, and actions that 
individuals or groups subject themselves to. It is these practices that Foucault called ethics 
or ethical work. Like power, ethics as the practical and for Foucault only form of freedom, 
takes liberty as its ontological condition (Foucault 1994: 5). However, ethical practices 
never take place in a social vacuum. They are not something invented by an individual, a 
single group or an organization, but are always in rapport with other social practices, 
including particular forms of knowledge, norms, techniques, and programs seeking to act 
upon the conduct of others (Foucault 1994: 11).  
 
This understanding of power has two important consequences. First, by conceiving of 
power and freedom as practices that are mutually related, it becomes possible to address 
autonomy as a particular mode of government. Second, it enables us to address power in 
terms of networks. However, this is not so much because individuals, organizations and 
networks are interacting, but because the exercise of power since the 19th century has 
increasingly depended on petty and mundane techniques circulating in a wide range of 
institutional settings. Or as Foucault would have it: ‘Power is exercised through networks, 
and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both 
submit to and exercise this power’ (Foucault 2003: 29). From this perspective, the new 
thing about network governance is not that the state is loosing out as a fixed point of 
hierarchical forms of power, an event that arguable started to take place with the ending of 
the absolutism two centuries ago. The new is rather that we are witnessing the rise of a 
whole range of norms and governmental technologies that seeks to promote autonomy, 
efficiency, and accountability by urging us to be active, participate and be responsible for 
oneself and for organizational goals, cf. section 4 below.3
 
The concept of governmentality then may be used to address network governance at the 
level of practices, i.e. as particular ways of acting and doing things. This implies analyzing 
all those devices, procedures, programs and mechanisms of authority through which 
individuals, organizations and networks are sought governed. Such practices of government 
may certainly take place in more or less institutionalized clusters or networks of individuals 
and organizations, but they are far from the only shape that indirect governing may take. 
Moreover, we may seek to address the rationalities (thoughts, reflections and calculations) 
informing and inscribed in these governmental technologies. This implies analyzing all 
 6
those rationalities, moral reflections, forms of expert knowledge that enframe, translate and 
thereby render certain issues amenable to planned intervention. 
 
 
3 Norms, normal, normalization and normativity 
 
If practices of government are increasingly taking place at a distance and depending on the 
self-steering capacities of individuals, organizations and networks, it may be fruitful to see 
how various norms are informing these governmental practices. I will try to provide a 
conception of norms as something embedded in concrete practices. Whereas various 
phenomenological and rational choice approaches found within for example new 
institutionalist theory addresses norms (and rules) from the point of view of the actor (seen 
either as embedded in symbolic systems of meaning and values or as pursuing externally 
given preferences), I am proposing we analyze how norms, which are inscribed in 
particular forms of knowledge and governmental technologies, may incite and produce the 
capacities to reflect, problematize, act and be free in very particular manners. 
 
To get a closer grip of this particular understanding we need to take a quick glance at the 
historical emergence and functioning of modern norms. The rise of modern, technical 
norms is associated with the scientific and technological transformations accompanying the 
rise of modern industrial enterprise from the end of the 19th century. Various forms of 
engineering of the production processes and products were sought described and analyzed 
in a common language that would allow standardization, coordination, interchangeability 
and compatibility of products. These attempts were institutionalized with the establishment 
of the first official bureaus of norms and standards in Western Europe and the US around 
the First World War. Yet, norms were not only applied to things, i.e. the non-human 
aspects of production. As early as the 1830s, Adolphe Quetelet introduced the notion of the 
homme type, namely that person whose biological characteristics constituted the average of 
a given population (Hacking 1990: 107ff). This conception informed his later discussion of 
the normal distribution of the physical characteristics of a population based on concrete 
measurements. Thus based on the measuring of the height and chest width of 5,000 
Scottish soldiers, Quetelet found that the distribution of the frequency of the various 
measures formed a bell-like curve on a chart. The point here is not so much that normal 
man, or homme type, of a given society was an entirely virtual artifact in as much as a few 
if any individuals were actually equipped with average features, but that this statistical-
technical artifact allowed one to operate in practical terms (including later political and 
eugenic programs) with the notion of a normal human type.  
 
A key feature of the term `normal´ is its reference not only to how things are, but also often 
how they ought to be. To evaluate whether a line is normal (orthogonal) or a person is 
normal (average) is a purely descriptive act pointing to the facticity of the evaluated object. 
Yet as pointed out by Ian Hacking, the calculation and making of the normal has also often 
implied a moral evaluation. One has sought to resolve this ambiguity by introducing the 
notion of “norm”: The normal was supposed to refer strictly to what is, while the norm 
should refer to what ought to be. Despite heroic attempts to uphold the distinction between 
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what is and what ought to be, this ambiguity associated with the term normal seems still to 
be haunting both academic discourse and political practice (Hacking 1990: 160-169).  
 
This ambiguity is however apparently of a rather recent origin. It is only with the French 
physiologist Broussais’ formulation in 1828 that the normal state is associated with the 
continuous deviation from organs usual and desirable functioning (cf. Canquilhem 1991: 
47). This notion of the normal was taken up by the emerging social sciences during the 
19th century. In his writings from the 1840s onwards, Auguste Comte associated the term 
normal with societal development starting with the theological society over the 
metaphysical society towards the positive polity, a line of progress that was not only 
regarded as an inevitable law but also a desirable one too in as much as the positive polity 
denoted a society governed by reason that would ensure human happiness (Comte 1851). 
Emile Durkheim’s theory of anomie expressed in his treatise on The Rules of Sociological 
Method published in 1894 and Suicide in 1897 was based on linking the normal with 
function. Thus for Durkheim both crime and suicide were “normal” acts. While clearly 
deviating from average conduct, Durkheim nonetheless saw them as indispensable to the 
normal functioning of society at that given stage of its evolution. In fact, crime was seen as 
indispensable to evolution of morality and law (Durkheim [1894] 1982: 101). This 
conception of the normal did not go unchallenged. In fact, a whole range of biological 
(Lambroso) and sociological inspired theories of crime depicted the latter as an 
abnormality (cf. Hacking 1990: 175). Thus, despite contending understandings of what 
constituted normal conduct, the normal became a predominant concept in understanding, 
explaining and evaluating social practices.  
 
How then could we fruitfully conceive of the notions of the normal, norm, normalization 
and normativity in a manner that would enable us to address their role in the practices of 
government? As a general principle we will have to approach norms in a way that allows us 
to address the ways in which they come into rapport with particular forms of knowledge in 
which these norms are inscribed on the one hand, and the particular practices, devices, 
schemes and programs of government on the other. Thus, by the term normal, I am 
referring to those factual evaluations of how things are that emerge through specific forms 
of knowledge and techniques of investigation and calculation enabling the machination of 
the normal state of things. I am thinking here not only of the Gaussian normal distribution 
and the calculation of statistical averages, but also of the techniques and forms of 
knowledge applied in industrial production (product and later process standards, Taylorist 
time and method studies), in actuarial and risk technologies (social security, life insurance, 
currency exchange rate fluctuation insurance etc.), and in psychological techniques (IQ 
measurements, personality tests, social competencies tests) (Rose 1990). The point here is 
to address the calculative and investigative techniques (statistics, survey sampling, 
questionnaires, interviews) and forms of knowledge (e.g. medicine, biology, sociology, 
psychology) through which the normal state of things is conceived and produced. 
 
I find it useful to use the term norm to refer to standards of conduct or being. By standards 
of conduct I am referring to the procedural standards informing for example a particular 
decision-making process (such as inviting stakeholders or making all decision-making 
documents accessible to the public). By standards of being I am referring to, for example, a 
 8
goal of an inflation rate of 3 per cent which guides monetary policies in a given nation. A 
fundamental point here is that both procedural norms and standards indicating a particular 
state of being are imbedded in particular practices (in casu a decision-making process and a 
monetary policy). Thus, I will conceive of norms neither as something located in the 
consciousness of men or women, nor as something that spring mysteriously from a certain 
“culture” and its abstract values. Norms are instead seen as produced through specific 
forms of knowledge and inscribed in diverse practices that they seek to regulate. It is in this 
practical-regulative sense that I believe we may fruitfully latch on to Canguilhem’s dictum: 
‘A norm that has nothing to regulate is nothing because it regulates nothing’ (Canguilhem 
1994: 383).  
 
What is then the relationship between the normal and a norm? Like the normal, the norm is 
articulated through a specific body of knowledge that provides a table of equivalence by 
which products, processes or individuality may be compared. In so far as this knowledge 
provides a language of equivalence in relation to which certain phenomena may be 
measured and individualized, it will enable differentiation and the generation of 
inequalities. If the above historical account is correct, it seems that in our societies the 
norm will often be closely related, if not directly owing its very existence, to the normal. 
For example, the (Taylorist) calculation of the normal time required for the average worker 
to complete a given element of the production process may be translated into a norm 
serving as a general standard of conduct for every worker to be followed. Nonetheless, the 
field of the normal hardly covers the entire field of norms. For example, norms may well be 
derived from moral or philosophical reflections based on civic virtues or forms of solidarity 
that need not – but certainly may be – based on conceptions and machinations of the 
normal. 
 
I am applying the term normalization to refer to the procedures and processes through 
which a norm is brought into play and informs the practices that it seeks to regulate. It 
refers to the diverse programs, procedures, and techniques by which an individual, a group 
or an organization take one or more norms as the reference for measuring and perhaps 
problematizing the adequacy, correctness or desirability of the ways they are doing things. 
For example, the analysis of whether a given economic practice is efficient when measured 
against a specific norm, or the structuring of a political act around a norm of participation 
are both instances of normalizing practices. In a specific sense, normalization will always 
lead to a change of practice. Thus, inasmuch as a specific norm begins to serve as a 
standard for the measuring and problematizing certain practices, the latter are already 
different from what they were before this happened. However, this is not be confused with 
a change of practices leading to the realization or implementation of the more or less 
operational norms informing these practices. The latter is obviously an empirical question - 
and one that is dealt with more adequately by normalizing approaches, such as evaluation 
studies. 
 
By the term normativity I am referring to the moral valuation (good or bad) of a particular 
norm (Canguilhem 1994: 362). For example, the moral approval of a particular standard of 
conduct such as self-reliance is an instance of normativity. From this point of view, 
normativity owes its very existence to the norm: moral valuation is always a valuation of a 
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particular norm. In contrast, neither the construction of the normal nor the processes of 
normalization are in themselves instances of normativity. Having defined the normal as the 
construction of what is, it obviously does not necessarily imply a moral evaluation, though 
as showed above this has in practice often been the case. But does not the process of 
normalization necessarily imply the moral affirmation of a particular norm? I find it fruitful 
here to uphold a distinction between the norm as a purely factual standard of conduct on 
the one hand, and normativity as the moral evaluation of that particular standard on the 
other. It is only when we start giving a moral valuation of, for example, a particular 
recruitment practice or an educational program revolving around the norm of intelligence 
levels that we are dealing with normativity. 
 
How are we to address the relationship between norms, normalization and the governing of 
conduct – whether of individuals or organizations? In answering this question, I find 
Francois Ewald’s suggestions useful (Ewald 1990). First, if norms may be regarded as 
referring not only to a state of being but also to a procedure, cf. above, then normalization 
may refer not only to making certain processes or products conform to a certain standard, 
but also to the choice of “procedures that will lead to some general consensus regarding the 
choice of norms and standards’ (ibid. 148). For example, a norm of participation informing 
certain decision-making processes in a network may specify criteria for the inclusion of 
participants in a network. But a norm could also refer to a procedure by which the network 
participants on an on-going basis negotiate who should be included in the network. 
 
Second, norms may be viewed as internal to a group. In so far as a norm is produced 
through the practices that it seeks to regulate, it may make sense to address the norm as ‘a 
way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a 
rigorous principle of self-referentiality’ (Ewald 1990: 154). Everyone in the group can 
measure, evaluate and identify himself or herself according to the norm, which is derived 
from, reproduced and updated by those for whom it will serve as a standard. Accordingly, 
one may speak of normalization when the group is urged if not forced to turn back upon 
and evaluate itself in relation to one or more specific norms. For example, while a 
particular norm of transparency informing the ways in which a particular network of 
organizations and individuals publicize and share information may be contested by others 
as being insufficient or not up to the standards (whatever they are), this local norm may be 
extremely effective in regulating the conduct of the network participants who in the process 
will reproduce and update that particular norm. A norm then is not simply a more or less 
universal value, but a strictly localized rule of judgement embedded in specific practices 
that serve to produce and update it.  
 
 
4 Addressing network governance in terms of norms, rationalities and technologies of 
government 
 
As explained above I am suggesting that we address network governance as a set of 
specific rationalities and technologies of government, where the latter is seen as a specific 
form of power that seeks to act upon the actions of others. Based on the notions of 
governmentality and normalization, how may we characterize more precisely the nature of 
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network governance? Foucault proposed the term liberal government to denote the 
rationalities and technologies of power that emerged from the end of the 18th century 
(Foucault 1988). This form of government was liberal in that its reflections, calculations 
and methods above all depended on governing through subjectivities rather than by 
subjecting individuals of civil society to an omni-potential state power. Hence, the 
metaphor the governmentalization of the state, rather than the etatisation of society. In 
conformity with this understanding, the recent restructuring of government have been 
dubbed neo-liberal government or advanced liberal government (Burchell 1996: 21-30; 
Dean 1999: 159, 164-165).4 These terms point not so much to the rolling back of the state 
action through privatisation and rationalization of the public sector, but to the proliferation 
of a series of governmental technologies seeking to make markets, factories, public and 
private organizations govern themselves according to norms of efficiency, accountability, 
and transparency, and to make individuals govern themselves according to norms of civility, 
wealth and well-being (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1999). To the extent that these 
governmental technologies seek to augment the governmental capacities of diverse 
organisations and individuals, it may perhaps be proper to view this as the 
governmentalization of government. 
 
Network governance then could be regarded as an instance of this conception of neo-liberal 
government. From this point of view, we could broadly characterize network governance as 
the diverse governmental rationalities, technologies and norms that seek to govern by 
promoting the self-steering capacities of individuals and organizations. On the one hand, 
such definition may be seen to be too broad in that it comprises forms of governing that go 
beyond the formation and functioning of networks of individuals and organizations. On the 
other hand, I find it suitable in order to avoid restricting the analytical scope to the 
phenomenological inspired focus on the interaction within and in the best cases between 
networks. In the following, I will briefly address some of the technologies and norms of 
government that I find is perhaps most pertinent to the functioning of networks, namely 
technologies and norms of agency, contract, performance, and accountability respectively.  
 
During the two decades, advanced liberal democracies have experienced the emergence of 
a whole series of practices around norms of activism, participation and empowerment. 
Such technologies of agency may seek to bring forth the voice and opinion of the citizens, 
such as opinion polls, surveys, public hearings, focus groups, citizen panels, workshops 
with groups of citizens.5 They may also seek to enable and induce citizens to be active and 
participate more directly in the decision-making processes, such as empowerment projects, 
school boards, community centers, consensus conferences, and citizens’ juries. 
Technologies of agency then may be instrumental to the formation of such networks. While 
the formation, shape and functioning of these networks vary immensely, which is an 
important feature of their governmental abilities, they nonetheless often seek to formulate 
policies based on a certain level of consensus and legitimacy by organizing clusters of 
stakeholders in loose, issue-based networks that may cut across national boundaries. These 
networks need neither be formalized in the sense of being governed by more or less 
universal rules or procedures, nor do they need to be initiated or organized by public 
authorities, though the latter may play an important role by urging certain individuals and 
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organizations to participate and by providing expertise, facilities and political opinions on 
proposals for possible ways of handling the issue in question.  
 
If technologies of agency may be instrumental to the formation of networks of individuals 
and organizations, contractual technologies and norms may be important to their continued 
functioning and reproduction. Many Western European countries have a long-standing 
tradition of outsourcing and delegating various social services and tasks to private 
enterprises and voluntary organizations. Recently however we have seen the surge of 
various devices and methods involved in the contracting out of social services in order to 
enhance efficiency, responsibility or the possibilities of individual choice. For example, 
there has been a proliferation of individual contracts between public authorities on the one 
hand, and the unemployed, the problematic parents, the welfare recipient, the delinquent 
etc. on the other, whereby both parties sign a contract containing a number of goals and 
obligations that both parties will seek to fulfil. At the organizational level, one sees the 
emergence of contracting out, tenders and outsourcing of social services, infrastructure 
utilities and educational functions to a variety of both public and private organizations. 
What is taking place then is not only the privatization of activities formerly undertaken by 
public agencies, but also the promotion of a certain competitive drive among the latter by 
creating a semi-market for social services. This process has included the re-articulation and 
creation of new linkages between private and public organizations with a view to enhance 
the legitimacy of policy formation and/or enhance the efficiency of policy outcomes.  
 
The tendency of contracting out and outsourcing of formerly public activities has been 
accompanied by the proliferation of what one may dub technologies and norms of 
performance. This term includes the devices and methods that seek ‘to penetrate the 
enclosures of expertise fostered under the welfare state and to subsume the substantive 
domains of expertise to new formal calculative regimes’ (Dean 1999a: 169). In a wide 
range of institutional settings we are witnessing the dispersion of techniques for the 
devolution of budgets, benchmarking, (self-) evaluation and assessment techniques that all 
seek to make the organizations themselves strive to perform better in relation to more or 
less stable norms of performance. By urging and at times even forcing organizations to 
constantly evaluate their own performance according to more or less officially recognized 
standards and norms, these technologies may be crucial for the functioning of issue-based 
networks. Not only may they allow for a certain room for external steering by central 
public authorities, they may also establish a more or less stable common conception among 
participants in the network of how things should be conducted and thereby ensure the 
network’s internal cohesion.  
 
Finally, another set of systems and techniques is informed not so much by norms of 
efficiency and output, but more on process norms evolving around the notions of 
accountability and transparency (Power 1997; 2003). These technologies of accountability, 
which may take the form of financial audits, environmental audits, value for money audits, 
management audits, or teaching audits, are brought into play across shifting boundaries of 
public and private activities. In the public sector they will often seek to enhance legitimacy 
by enhancing insights into the ways that taxpayers money are spend. In the private sectors, 
these technologies are dealing not only with monetary flows and balances, but also with 
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social responsibility based on standards of proper company conduct. Thus, an increasing 
number of private companies, notably transnational corporations, are formulating non-legal 
norms pertaining to working conditions, the environment, obligations to the local 
community etc. These norms are produced and updated not by a single legislative authority, 
but in the interplay between marketing strategies and technologies, consumer perception 
analyses, and norms proposed by international bodies, such as OECD, the World Bank, 
UNCTAD, and ILO.  What is new about these technologies is perhaps not so much that 
they increase the scope of organizational control or self-control, but rather that they render 
new phenomena visible and reshape relations within and between organizations. Thus these 
techniques may facilitate new relations within and between public and private 
organizations by making them reflect upon, monitor and conduct themselves in relation to 
particular forms of norms, procedures and knowledge on transparency and accountability.  
 
Network governance conceived as above give rise to several fundamental questions 
regarding the ways in which networks are informed by norms of conduct and norms of 
being. First, we could ask what norms – pertaining to autonomy, efficiency and 
accountability - are informing the processes by which a multitude of different stakeholders 
seek to reach a decision on a series of actions to be taken? And here we may note that there 
need not be any agreement on what exactly constitutes autonomy, efficiency and 
accountability. While such lack of clarity give rise to struggles that may dissolve the entire 
network, they may just as well prove to be facilitating the political processes taking place 
through the network. Second, we could ask how do these networks reshape and update 
norms of being informing the political issues dealt with. For example, in the case of 
employment policies how are networks informed by and reshaping norms of activism, 
entrepreneurship, and life-long learning? The point of all this would be to analyze if, how, 
and with what effects the network participants are urged if not forced – by the other 
participants, by their own constituency, by politicians by concerned social scientists, and by 
themselves - to relate to these norms not only with regard to problematization and the 
enframing of a certain issue, but also with regard to the procedural practices that make up 
the process of political networking. Third, we could ask how the technologies and norms 
described above are changing the relations and forms of authority between public and 
private organizations? Fourth but hardly finally, we could ask what groups and practices 
are deemed inferior and thereby excluded by resorting to contemporary norms of autonomy, 
efficiency, performance? I believe that these and many other questions are in need of closer 
investigation, and it is my belief that the framework elaborated above may contribute to 
this task. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The proliferating debate on government and (network) governance is raising many 
pertinent questions concerning our understanding of contemporary forms of rule and 
authority. How can we conceive and analyze political practices and processes if the state as 
a particular institutional set-up, defining a particular hierarchical mode of authority, and a 
particular form of legitimate authority can no longer serve as the anchor-point? These and 
many other pertinent questions are raised with increasing force by the governance literature. 
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However, as briefly discussed in the introduction I do not find the answers provided so far 
to these questions entirely satisfactory, notably but not exclusively due to the way that 
agency is addressed. 
 
In order to supplement our understanding of network governance, I have tried in this paper 
to propose a framework based on the concepts of norms and normalization one the one 
hand, and Foucault’s notion of governmentality and power on the other. The analytical 
potential of the concepts rests with the capacity to address the manifold and concrete ways 
in which norms are enabling and at the same time updated by various rationalities and 
technologies of government. They have the capacity to analyze what I have termed 
normalizing effects, i.e. how certain ways of governing come to be seen as taken for 
granted and very little susceptible to questioning. They may also address how norms of 
autonomy, participation and influence depend on specific techniques and practices that may 
function at the expense of excluding other forms of governing. 
 
Such a conceptual framework will also be attentive to the ways in which governmental 
technologies are brought into play through (potentially normalizing) forms of expert 
knowledge, such as industrial psychology, micro economics, business administration, 
auditing, accounting, public administration and even political philosophy. This is not to be 
conflated with the claim that we are now entering the wholly normalized society. Thus it is 
not a matter of checking out the extent to which the recommendations by experts are 
realized, nor whether expert knowledge is determining political reforms and interventions, 
but rather how they inform, enframe and enable particular ways of intervening. In other 
words, it would pay attention in particular temporal, societal and institutional settings of the 
ways in which expert knowledge renders reality visible and how it translates and shapes 
problems into a form amenable to intervention. In particular, it would address how 
expertise contributes to the setting of standards for what constitutes the most proper and 
efficient modes of conduct when it comes for instance to promote the efficiency, 
accountability, or participation of individuals, groups or organizations in a particular 
political process.  
 
It would also address how norms of autonomy, self-determination, influence and 
participation interrelate with concrete governmental technologies that seek to promote, 
foster and induce individuals and organizations to be active and take responsibility for the 
discussion, formulation, and possibly implementation of particular problems and issues. 
That is to say, it would analyze the norms brought into play in the attempts to promote the 
self-steering capacities of individuals, networks and organizations. It would finally pay 
attention to the dividing effects of these norms and practices: What particular practices are 
being deemed inefficient, non-transparent, lacking accountability or in other ways 
incompatible with prevailing norms of acting and being? 
 
What would the status of such an analysis of government and norms be? In its own terms it 
would definitely not be a normalizing framework. Not only would it refrain from operating 
with particular norms against which the practices studies could be evaluated as normal, 
autonomous, efficient, accountable etc., it would also refrain from ascribing to a particular 
methodological standard supporting its own analysis. That is, it would not discipline itself 
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according to certain more or less fixed procedures for data collection and data processing. 
If defined as moral evaluation, this type of analysis would not be normative: it would not 
provide – on the basis of a more or less explicit normative grounding – judgements as to 
whether this or that analyzed practice is good or bad. However, it would definitively be 
normative if we expand that term to include a concern for problematizing the effects of the 
concrete interrelations between normalizing forms of knowledge and practices of 
government. This implies that while this analysis is above all descriptive by asking 
questions of what and how rather than why, it is definitely not a neutral description. In fact, 
its critical potential rests exactly with its ability to describe practices, norms and forms of 
knowledge that either have been deemed unworthy of scientific analysis, or to describe 
these in a manner that will illuminate how they interact and depend on one another in a 
manner that have reached little attention before. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited importantly from the critical comments by the members of the 
Center for Democratic Network Governance, Roskilde University, Denmark. 
 
2 For an overview of different understandings of (network) governance, see (Torfing, 
Sørensensen and Christensen 2003). 
 
3 This understanding of government has informed some very interesting analyses of the role 
the attempts to promote the common market and a common employment strategy in the 
European Union (Haahr and Walters 2003; Haahr 2004). 
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4 Mitchell Dean seems to be making a distinction between neo-liberalism as the form of 
governing relying above all on the capacities of the market and advanced liberalism as the 
form of governing relying on the self-governing capacities of a plurality of more or less 
autonomous and interacting public and private organisations (Dean 1999: 159, 164-196). 
 
5 I use the term technologies of agency in a manner close to Barbara Cruikshank’s notion of 
technologies of citizenship (Cruikshank 1999). However, I have chosen the term 
technology of agency to underscore the norms of activism and participation embedded in 
these practices rather than the norms for deciding what is regarded the proper conduct of a 
citizen. For the same reasons, I choose to distinguish the term technologies of agency from 
technologies of contract and performance (for a different categorization see Dean 1999: 
167-168). 
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